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DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE
As the Louisiana jurist/lawyer reads the new obligations articles in
his Civil Code,' one article certain to attract his attention is article 1967.
This article, which defines the civilian concept of "cause," also presents
the common law notion of "detrimental reliance." 2 The new article
states:
Art. 1967. Cause defined; detrimental reliance
Cause is the reason why a party obligates himself. A party
may be obligated by a promise when he knew or should have
known that the promise would induce the other party to rely
on it to his detriment and the other party was reasonable in so
relying. Recovery may be limited to the expenses incurred or
the damages suffered as a result of the promisee's reliance on
the promise. Reliance on a gratuitous promise made without
required formalities is not reasonable.
This comment will examine the origins of detrimental reliance and some
of the implications of the principle's insertion into the theory of cause.
Secondly, the impact new article 1967 will have on the Louisiana jurisprudence will be considered. Finally, this paper will demonstrate that
the repeal of the last sentence of article 1967 is desirable and possibly
the only way to allow detrimental reliance to have a full positive impact
on the Louisiana jurisprudence.
Sources of Detrimental Reliance
The theory of detrimental reliance is embodied in the doctrine of
promissory estoppel. 3 Promissory estoppel was invented by the common
law courts to cure one of the shortcomings of their rigid doctrine of
"consideration." ' 4 All systems of law demand that "something else" be

Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Articles 1756-2291 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 [hereinafter cited as OA
(old articles)] were abrogated and replaced by new articles 1756-2057 [hereinafter cited as
NA]; see 1984 La. Acts, No. 331, § 1.
2. Detrimental reliance apparently may also be regarded as a civil law notion. 1 S.
Litvinoff, Obligations § 88, at 135 n.32, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1969).
3. The most authoritative statement of this doctrine is contained in the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 90(1) (1979):
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does
induce such action or forbearance, is binding if injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited
as justice requires.
4. Although detrimental reliance may have its roots in the Civil Law, "promissory
estoppel" is strictly a common law doctrine.
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present in order to make any promise legally binding. At common law,
that "something else" is something bargained for and given in exchange
for the promise, i.e. "consideration." 5 Many times, however, promises
are made which induce the promisee to take some action in reliance
upon the promise causing him to suffer a detriment, but the detriment
suffered cannot be regarded as bargained-for consideration. In these
situations, justice may only be achieved if the promisor is estopped to
deny the binding force of his promise.
Promissory estoppel is the doctrine the Louisiana State Law Institute
asked the reporter to the revision of the Louisiana Civil Code on
Obligations to incorporate into the Civil Code. 6 But the essence'of this
doctrine is not present in the revised code. 7 Promissory estoppel is usually
applied at common law to promises which would be considered purely
gratuitous at civil law. Although not all gratuitous promises require
formalities, 8 the majority of them are considered donations 9 which require
a notarial act executed before two witnesses to be valid.' 0 If the formalities are complied with, there is no need to prove detrimental reliance
because the notarial act provides the necessary "something else." But
the last sentence of article 1967 clearly states that detrimental reliance
cannot be used to make purely gratuitous promises enforceable if the
required formalities are not met. Thus, the new Louisiana version of
"promissory estoppel" is very different from its common law counterpart. The last sentence of article 1967 precludes the use of the article
to solve the problems the common law doctrine of promissory estoppel
was devised to handle."
In 1952, the Louisiana Supreme Court expressly stated that prom-

S. "Technically, consideration is defined as some right, interest, profit, or benefit
accruing to one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility given,
suffered, or undertaken by the other." 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 85 (1964).
6. Obligations Revision-Cause, Meeting of the Advisory Committee, Reporter's Note
(Apr. 20, 1979) (on file with Louisiana State Law Institue, Paul M. Hebert Law Center,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana). The reporter and chief drafter of the revision was Professor
Saul Litvinoff.
7. Professor Litvinoff's original draft did capture the essence of promissory estoppel.
The changes which removed this effect were made at the request of other Law Institute
members. See infra text accompanying notes 69-71.
8. Our Civil Code provides a few gratuitous contracts which do not require formalities: the loan for use (La. Civ. Code art. 2894), the deposit (La. Civ. Code art.
2991), and the non-remunerative suretyship (La. Civ. Code art. 3035). It should also be
noted that a gratuitous promise to do something which does not deplete the promisor's
patrimony should not be considered a donation and therefore should be enforceable without
formalities.
9. Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 La. L. Rev. 2, 15-16 (1951).
10. La. Civ. Code art. 1536.
11. The effects of this last sentence will be dealt with more extensively later in this
Note.
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issory estoppel was an unknown theory to Louisiana law. In Ducote v.
Oden, 12 the plaintiff had sued for the alleged breach of a contract to
remove overburden from the defendant's gravel pit. The plaintiff contended that the contract had a stipulated term of three years, but that
the defendant had terminated it after seven months. The plaintiff further
alleged that he had spent large sums of money on new equipment in
reliance upon the defendant's promise to continue their contract for
three years, thus entitling him to recovery under promissory estoppel.
The court ruled that the plaintiff had failed to establish any sort of
promise concerning a term for the contract. This holding should have
disposed of the case regardless of the plaintiff's attempted theory of
recovery. However, the court went on to reject "promissory estoppel"
on a doctrinaire basis without pointing out that Louisiana uses a rough
equivalent to this theory, equitable estoppel. 3 Thus comment "d" to
new article 1967 states that Ducote v. Oden is overruled by the new
article. This is true to the extent that the statement in Ducote concerning
"promissory estoppel" has been overruled, but the result in Ducote
would be the same under the new law because no promise was established
4
by the plaintiff.
Although the immediate source of Louisiana's detrimental reliance
is obviously promissory estoppel, there are at least two civil law theories
which express the same basic idea. It has even been argued that the
5
common law derived promissory estoppel from one of these theories.
Thus, new article 1967 may have its deepest roots in the civil law.
The first of these civil law sources of detrimental reliance is the
Roman principle venire contra factum proprium non valet, which translates "no one is allowed to go against (the consequences of) his own
acts." It has been stated that this Roman doctrine underlies many civil
code articles, such as Louisiana Civil Code article 1791 .16 Article 1791
has been repealed by the 1984 revision, but venire contra factum proprium non valet apparently underlies several of the new articles, including
7
article 1967.1
The Louisiana courts have rarely recognized this rule explicitly. The
court in Sanders v. United Distributorss stated that it was unsuccessful

12. 221 La. 228, 59 So. 2d 130 (1952).
13. "Such a theory [promissory estoppel] is unknown to our law .....
Id. at 234,
59 So. 2d at 132. The doctrine of equitable estoppel will be discussed later in this Note.
14. The implication that Louisiana now recognizes promissory estoppel must be qualified by the preceding explanation of the effect of the last sentence of NA 1967.
15. Obligations Revision-Cause, supra note 6.
16. 1 S. Litvinoff, supra note 2.
17. For other examples see NA 1924 and NA 1928.
18. 405 So. 2d 536 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
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in finding any express use of this doctrine in the Louisiana jurisprudence. 9 In the recent case of Hebert v. McGuire,20 however, Justice
Reddman of the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, who also
wrote the Sanders opinion, recognized venire contra factum proprium
non valet as a valid theory for enforcing a promise. In Hebert the
plaintiff, a doctor, sued the defendant for an unpaid surgery bill. The
defendant's defense was that the doctor's employee promised to file her
medical insurance claim, failed to do so, and did not inform the defendant that her bill was overdue until it was too late for her to collect
from the insurance company. The court held that the promise to file
the insurance claim could have been part of the contract between the
doctor and his patient because it was made before the operation took
place. The court then stated that even if the promise had been gratuitous
it would be enforceable under either estoppel or "the civil law doctrine
against contravening one's own acts." ' 2' Although the court did not base
its decision on venire contra factum proprium non valet, by recognizing
this doctrine, it did lay the groundwork for its possible future application.
The second civil law forerunner of Louisiana's detrimental reliance
is the German doctrine culpa in contrahendo. This theory, which roughly
translates "fault in contracting," is used to prevent a party from damaging another party in the process of contracting. Thus, culpa in contrahendo is similar to detrimental reliance, although possibly a bit
broader. 22 This theory has also been recognized as underlying several
Louisiana Civil Code articles, 23 but has not been used in the Louisiana
jurisprudence as a controlling basis of recovery. In Coleman v. Bossier
City,2 4 however, culpa in contrahendo was suggested for the first time
as a possible source of quasi-contractual obligations under Louisiana
law. The court expressly declined to base its decision on this theory,
choosing the well-recognized theory of unjust enrichment instead as the
controlling principle. Nevertheless, the fact that Coleman recognized
culpa in contrahendo may lend credence to the assertion that detrimental
reliance has been underlying Louisiana's civil law and is not purely a
common law import.
Based on the few times culpa in contrahendo and venire contra
factum proprium non valet have been cited in the Louisiana jurisprudence, one might argue that article 1967 has no basis in Louisiana's civil
law tradition. However, detrimental reliance in article 1967 cannot be
considered a sudden invasion of promissory estoppel into our law.
19. Id. at 537 n.2.
20. 447 So. 2d 64 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
21. Id.at 65.

22. See generally H. Schwenk, Culpa in Contrahendo in German, French and Louisiana Law, 15 Tul. L. Rev. 87 (1940).
23. Id. at 88.
24. 305 So. 2d 444 (La. 1974).
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Louisiana has applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel (or estoppel in

pais) for well over one hundred years. 25 Equitable estoppel is similar to
promissory estoppel, but is broader. This theory is "the effect of the
voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is barred from asserting rights

against another party who has justifiably relied on such conduct and
who has changed his position to his detriment as a result of such
reliance." ' 26 Equitable estoppel, although based upon equity and good

faith, is not favored under Louisiana law and should only be applied
in extraordinary cases since estoppel by definition denies a party the
2
ability to assert a legal right.
Equitable estoppel has been applied to a wide variety of situations

in Louisiana, some of which could fall under article 1967.2 This doctrine
has also been applied to many situations which might not fall under
article 1967, most notably in cases involving silent acquiescence as opposed to a promise. 29 The fact that estoppel is a well-established doctrine

in Louisiana should make the insertion of detrimental reliance into our
Civil Code easier. The Louisiana attorney seeking guidance from the
jurisprudence on a specific question involving detrimental reliance should
find help in these cases. There are numerous estoppel cases which discuss

issues such as whether reliance occurred, whether it was justified, and
whether there was any detriment to the promisee.3 0 However, one must
bear in mind the differences between equitable estoppel and article 1967
as one searches this case law. While equitable estoppel should not be
permitted to prevail when in absolute opposition to the positive written

law, 3' article 1967 is a positive written law. Our courts also cannot start

25. See Marsh v. Smith, 5 Rob. 518 (La. 1843); Montague v. Weil & Bros., 30 La.
Ann. 50 (1878).
26. Duthu v. Allements' Roberson Mach. Works, 393 So. 2d 184, 186 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1980).
27. See Shirey v. Campbell, 151 So. 2d 557 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963); Breaux v.
Laird, 230 La. 221, 88 So. 2d 33 (1956).
28. See, e.g., Sanders v. United Distribs., 405 So. 2d 536 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981);
Southern Discount Co. v. Williams, 226 So. 2d 60 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
29. For a thorough treatment of the requirements for basing an estoppel plea on
silence, see Duthu v. Allements' Roberson Mach. Works, 393 So. 2d 184 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1980).
30. For example, from American Bank and Trust v. Trinity Universal Ins., 251 La.
445, 205 So. 2d 35 (1967), one may extract the "rule" that reliance upon a representation
of law is not justified except in extraordinary situations; from Whitehall Oil v. Boagni,
255 La. 67, 229 So. 2d 702 (1969), one can deduce support for the contention that a
party who receives money he is not entitled to may not claim that he has suffered any
detriment when the court attempts to adjudicate it to its rightful owner, even if that
party was originally induced to accept the money; and in Best Elec. Supply v. Rittiner,
334 So. 2d 792 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976) one finds the principle that the party basing
his claim upon detrimental reliance must prove that he has been induced to do something
he would not have otherwise done in order to prove that he relied upon the promise.
31. Port Fin. Co. v. Ber, 45 So. 2d 404 (La. App. Orl. 1950).
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their analysis of detrimental reliance with a statement of its unfavored
status as they do with estoppel. These differences could make many
holdings from estoppel cases inapplicable to article 1967 cases.3 2
Some commentators have suggested that Louisiana's equivalent to
estoppel is the theory of "unjust enrichment." 33 The judiciary created
this equitable remedy by expanding OA 1965.14 Unjust enrichment is
similar to detrimental reliance in that both are based upon fairness and
good faith, but as their names suggest, they focus upon different mattersunfair enrichment and unfair impoverishment. Unjust enrichment requires a corresponding impoverishment, but detrimental reliance does
not require a corresponding enrichment. Despite these differences, the
two theories should complement each other. When one person is unjustly
enriched at the expense of another, either theory might apply. If no
promise induced the unfair shift of wealth, unjust enrichment is the
only appropriate remedy. On the other hand, if the elements of detrimental reliance are all met, but the detriment suffered by the promisee
has not accrued to the promisor, unjust enrichment will not apply. Thus,
detrimental reliance may be regarded as an equitable rule designed to
fill certain gaps in the civil law's ancient rule of equity-unjust enrichment. To this extent, unjust enrichment is a source of article 1967.
Cause
Because Louisiana's new theory of detrimental reliance is found in
the Civil Code article defining the requirement of cause, these two
concepts are obviously meant to be related. Therefore, a brief explanation
of the theory of cause is necessary in order to provide the background
for an analysis of detrimental reliance.
As previously stated, all systems of law require something in addition
to a bare promise in order to create an enforceable obligation. In civil
law systems, the theory of cause, as opposed to the common law's
32. The implications of these basic differences are difficult to state in any more
specific terms. One should just be aware that if the holding in an estoppel case seems
to have been affected by this "second-class" status of estoppel, perhaps it will not be
very persuasive precedent for NA 1967 cases.
33. Department of Culture, Recreation & Tourism v. Fort Macomb Dev. Corp., 385
So. 2d 1233 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980); Burk v. Livingston Parish School Bd., 190 La.
504, 182 So. 656 (1938). The most common and simplest enunciation of this rule is that
"one cannot accept the benefits of an act and repudiate its obligations." Department of
Culture, Recreation & Tourism, 385 So. 2d at 1237.
34. A strict reading of OA 1965 and the preceding articles would indicate that the
rules of equity stated therein, including "that no one ought to enrich himself at the
expense of another," are rules meant to supplement a valid contract where the contract
is silent. But the jurisprudence has often applied unjust enrichment to situations involving
invalid contracts and even no contract at all. Since the official comments to NA 2055
(which basically restates the rules of OA 1965) state that NA 2055 does not change the
law, the courts should continue to apply unjust enrichment as a general rule of equity.
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consideration, serves this function. Cause and consideration are analogous in that both theories provide the "clothing" that makes a promise
a binding obligation, 5 but cause is a much broader theory. Whereas
consideration is only present when something of value has been bargained
for and received in exchange for the promise, a valid cause is present
whenever the promisor had a legal motive or reason for making his
promise.16 At civil law, more promises are enforceable because the civil
law states that promises should be enforceable just because they are
promises.17 Any expression of a will to be bound is enough to bind a
person, as long as it is a true expression of the will.38 Thus, the theory
of cause serves as a method of protecting the contractual will because
any promise made without a cause cannot be a true expression of an
intent to be bound. 9 It is, of course, impossible to conceive of a situation
in which someone makes a promise for no subjective reason at all. But
cause is considered as non-existent when an objective element of the
will is missing. In other words, when a person makes a promise because
he thinks a certain thing or state of facts exists, which does not in fact
40
exist, his promise has no cause and is not binding.
Another important function of cause is contract classification. When
a person makes a promise because he expects something of value in
return, the contract is onerous. These are the most common contracts
and the only kind of contracts recognized at common law. But civilian
onerous contracts encompass more, because the benefit received in return
may be purely subjective whereas consideration contemplates something
of economic value. When a promisor's motive for making a promise is
purely a spirit of liberality, and he is to receive nothing tangible in
return, the contract is gratuitous. There are a few exceptions, 41 but most
gratuitous promises are considered donations. 42 Cause is also used to
classify certain special onerous contracts. Most notably, the cause of
43
transaction or compromise is the intent to avoid litigation.
Cause also serves as a tool for judicial control over contracts, to
preserve the social order. A contract which would create an illegal or
35. See generally A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts: One Volume Edition §§ 110, 111
(1952).
36. For an example of how Louisiana courts should enforce promises which lack
consideration under the theory of cause, see Matthews v. Williams, 25 La. Ann. 585
(1873).
37. Smith, supra note 9, at 4.
38. This statement is of course subject to certain limitations such as the requirements
of formalities in Civil Code article 1536.
39. This idea was well stated in OA 1824.
40. This idea, which was expressed in OA 1896 and OA 1897, is implicit in NA
1966 and 1967.
41. See supra note 8.
42. Smith, supra note 9, at 5.
43. La. Civ. Code art. 3071.
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unjust solution if enforced is said to have an unlawful cause. 44 This
function of cause illustrates the fact that although the theory of cause
is based on one's subjective intentions, it must be applied to objective
circumstances. In recognition of this fact, the drafters of the revision
changed the definition of cause from the "motive" for contracting to
the "reason" one binds himself. 45 Although this change should not affect
the jurisprudence, it does bring the definition of cause more in line
with the manner in which it is applied.
This brief discussion of the theory of cause does not purport to
fully explain this complex theory.4 6 This discussion provides the background for the problem at hand: how does the insertion of detrimental
reliance into the article on cause affect the theory of obligations?
Obligations Theory-The Infusion of Detrimental Reliance
One could argue that detrimental reliance has no place in our law
because the theory of cause encompasses every problem contemplated
by detrimental reliance. 47 If a person makes a promise, a court may
enforce that promise by finding some valid reason why the party obligated himself. Civilian courts need not focus on a bargained-for exchange as common law courts do. The flaw in this argument is that if
the promisor is to receive nothing in return for his promise, the promise
should usually be deemed a donation and thus subject to the requirements
of form. 48 Thus, detrimental reliance would be useful to enforce informal
gratuitous promises in Louisiana when justice so demands. However,
the last sentence of article 1967 precludes its use for this purpose.
Assuming that the drafters intended that detrimental reliance have some
utility, a careful analysis of article 1967 and its placement in the Civil
Code is necessary.
The first question presented is whether detrimental reliance is a new
element of contracts or a different, separate source of obligations. Article
1967 does not reveal whether detrimental reliance is a new element of
contracts, a substitute for cause, or a source of contractual obligations.
The article only provides that a party may be obligated by a promise
in certain situations. This suggests that detrimental reliance is a new
source of obligations. On the other hand, article 1967 is found in the
44. This idea was implicit in OA 1895 and is explicit in NA 1968 which states: "[tihe
cause of an obligation is unlawful when the enforcement of the obligation would produce
a result prohibited by law or against public policy."
45. OA 1897; NA 1967.
46. For a thorough treatment of cause, see I S. Litvinoff, supra note 2, at §§ 196399; and Smith, supra note 9.
47. See Comment, Promissory Estoppel and Louisiana, 31 La. L. Rev. 84 (1970).
48. Even if the promisor recieves nothing tangible in return, the agreement should
not be deemed a donation if the person's reason for making the promise was actually
onerous.
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Civil Code section on conventional obligations and defines an essential
element of these Louisiana contracts-cause; this suggests that detrimental reliance is an element of contracts.
The question of whether detrimental reliance is a new element of
contracts or a separate source of obligations is important in considering
whether or not the other requirements for a valid contract must be
present in order to enforce an obligation on the basis of detrimental
reliance. If detrimental reliance is considered as merely a substitute for
cause (and thus only an element of a contract), then the other elements
of contracts-capacity, consent, and object-must all be present in order
to enforce a promise on this basis. On the other hand, if article 1967
creates a new source of obligations, as its explicit terms suggest, these
other elements need not be present.
The problem of whether detrimental reliance is an element of contracts or a new source of obligations is also important in considering
which prescriptive period applies to actions based on detrimental reliance.
A strong argument could be made that detrimental reliance is more
correctly considered a tort theory than a contract theory. Whenever a
party argues detrimental reliance, they do so because the promise lacked
something essential to forming a "regular" contract. Detrimental reliance
is simply not based upon one's intent to be bound (the basis of contract).
The purpose of detrimental reliance is to prevent a party from harming
another party by acting as if he is willing to obligate himself. Thus,
the promise may be viewed as just another "act of man that causes
damage to another, '

49

as opposed to a contract.

It is doubtful whether this issue could ever be resolved by a theoretical debate. The solution to this difficult issue, therefore, lies in a
practical approach to article 1967. Detrimental reliance is an equitable
rule inserted in our Civil Code which must be construed in conjunction with the rules of contracts."0 In order to enforce a promise based
on detrimental reliance, the courts need only find the requirements stated
in article 1967. However, the other rules of contracts should be used
to help interpret article 1967. For example, if the promisor lacks capacity,
reliance on his promise may not be reasonable." If there has been no

49. La. Civ. Code art. 2315. It is interesting to note that the Louisinaa Law Institute
considered moving detrimental reliance from the obligations section of the code to the
quasi-contracts or quasi-delicts section. The fact that they decided not to do so indicates
that they contemplated detrimental reliance as being a sort of contractual remedy despite
its uncontractual nature. Obligations Revision-Council Minutes at 7 (Sept. 21-22, 1979)
(on file with Louisiana State Law Institute).
50. La. Civ. Code art. 17.
51. This would depend upon whether or not the promisee had any reason to believe
that the promisor was incapacitated. Whether or not the incapacitated promisor could
know (or should know) that his promise would induce action by the promisee is discussed

infra note 76.
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effective offer and acceptance, perhaps no promise has been made. In
considering which prescriptive period to apply, detrimental reliance should
be considered as an "other personal action," 5 2 since the legislature has
expressed no desire to have it considered a tort or anything else (except
possibly a contract), even though it does have tort characteristics. Therefore, the general ten-year period should apply, and our courts may never
have to decide the most difficult issue about detrimental reliance: they
may never have to decide exactly what it is.
While detrimental reliance does not harmonize well with the civilian
theory of contracts, as stated above, its placement in the code indicates
that it is designed to deal with contracts' problems. This is supported
by the fact that article 1967 deals with "promises," which are usually
the foundation of contracts. Therefore detrimental reliance must have
been designed to deal with defective contracts, i.e. promises that lack
an essential element of a contract. More specifically, it must have been
included to deal with some of the problem areas of cause. 3 This conclusion finds much support in the new obligations articles. The best
evidence supporting this conclusion is the placement of detrimental reliance in the same article as the definition of cause. More support for
this proposition lies in the fact that the other necessary elements for
the formation of a contract have their own built-in detrimental reliance
mechanisms. For example, the new articles concerning the irrevocability
of an offer 4 protect an offeree who may rely upon an offer before he
formally accepts it. These rules recognize that when an offeror either
explicitly or implicitly gives the offeree time to accept an offer, the
offeree will often take action in reliance upon the offer before he
formally accepts it."Another example of a built in detrimental reliance
mechanism is contained in NA 1924. Under this rule, a minor may not
avoid a contract by declaring his incapacity when doing so would cause
an injustice to a party who has reasonably relied upon the minor's
representation of majority. Thus, when the requirements of consent or
capacity are imperfect an obligation might be created even without article
1967 if a person could be harmed by relying upon some representation
by the other party. It appears, therefore that the legislature must have
intended that detrimental reliance be used to deal with some problems
connected with the theory of cause (although other applications are
possible and will be discussed later).
Despite the drafters' apparent intentions, the most troublesome areas
52. "Unless otherwise provided by legislation, a personal action is subject to a
liberative prescription of ten years." La. Civ. Code art. 3499.
53. See infra note 56.
54. NA 1928-1934.
55. See generally Herman, Detrimental Reliance in Louisiana Law: Past, Present and
Future?-The Code Drafter's Perspective, 58 Tul. L. Rev. 707, 734-40 (1984).
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of the application of cause5 6 will not be solved by Louisiana's detrimental
reliance. In most of these problem areas, the court must decide whether
a promise is gratuitous or onerous in order to determine whether or
not to apply the strict rules of form associated with donations. Because
the last sentence of article 1967 precludes the use of detrimental reliance
as a basis for enforcing gratuitous promises when the rules of form are
applicable, the courts will have to use the same analysis in these cases
they have always used.
Charitable subscription cases are the most notorious for causing
problems in the application of cause (or consideration at common law).
In these cases, a party promises to pay a certain sum to a charitable
institution, receiving nothing tangible in return. The courts recognize
the social need for enforcing these promises even though they lack the
necessary legal "clothing." ' 7 In the common law charitable subscription
8
cases, the courts historically used faulty logic to impute consideration.
To dispense with this necessity, the doctrine of promissory estoppel has
been used. In Louisiana, analysis of charitable subscription cases has
been based on the characterization of the cause of the promise as either
gratuitous or onerous. If the promise is considered purely gratuitous,
it should be unenforceable unless a notarial act has been executed before
two witnesses. As a result Louisiana courts have resorted to questionable
reasoning in characterizing these gratuitous promises as onerous. Louisiana's version of detrimental reliance will not solve this problem, as
promissory estoppel has done in the common law, as illustrated by an
examination of the leading charitable subscription case in the Louisiana
jurisprudence.
In Louisiana College v. Keller,5 9 the defendant subscribed to contribute $500.00 towards the establishment of a college at Jackson, Louisiana. The defendant later refused to pay, claiming a lack of consideration
for his promise. The court held that the defendant's promise was supported by a valid cause whether it was "the advantage the defendant
expected to derive from the establishment of a college at his own door,
• or it may have been a spirit of liberality and a desire to be
distinguished as the patron of letters." ' 60 The court also stated that "[iln
contracts of beneficence, the intention to confer a benefit is a sufficient
consideration;" '6' thus, the court ignored the fact that if the cause of
56. Some of these problem areas
S. Litvinoff, The Law of Obligations
108-62 (1979); Herman, supra note 55,
of detrimental reliance.
57. See I S.Litvinoff, supra note
58. But see supra note 8.
59. 10 La. 164 (1836).
60. Id. at 167 (emphasis added).
61. Id.

are identified, and the leading cases presented in
in the Louisiana Jurisprudence: A Course Book
deals with some of these areas also in the context
2, § 265, at 478 n.97 and cases cited therein.
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the promise was the intention to confer a benefit, an authentic act
should have been necessary to make the promise binding. 62 The court
obviously felt uncomfortable with inventing the "advantage" of having
a college nearby as the defendant's cause. It implicity recognized that
the defendant's principal motive was to confer a benefit. But the court
should have relied exclusively upon this contrived motive in order to
characterize the cause as onerous, making the promise enforceable without formalities. If the last sentence of article 1967 were repealed, detrimental reliance could be utilized to enforce a promise such as the
defendant made in Louisiana College. The court could have ruled that
the institution relied upon the defendant's promise by setting out to
establish the college, 63 and the necessity of devising an onerous cause
or ignoring the effects of a gratuitous cause would be alleviated. As
article 1967 is now written, a court would first have to determine that
the promise was not gratuitous and, thus, not subject to the rules of
form before detrimental reliance could be applied. In this case detrimental
reliance would not be needed because the promise would be enforceable
as an onerous contract.
The Louisiana courts have also had problems in applying the theory
of cause to "innominate contracts." These are agreements which lack
the necessary elements to be classified as any one of the Civil Code's
enumerated contracts. In most of these cases, one of the parties claims
that since the agreement cannot be classified as any specific onerous
contract (such as sale), it must be a donation. The court then struggles
to classify the agreement as a nameless onerous contract in order to
enforce it without requiring the formalities of a donation. 64 These cases
could be resolved by applying detrimental reliance, without having to
wrestle with the difficult question of onerousity or gratuity, if the last
sentence of article 1967 were repealed.
There are other areas in which the application of cause has been
troublesome. For example, promises to remunerate for past services,
promises to pay the debt of another, and natural obligations have been
especially problematic at times. 65 These situations are all similar to
charitable subscriptions and innominate contracts in two ways: the court
must decide whether to classify the informal promise as onerous or
gratuitous and the last sentence of article 1967 precludes its application
to these problems.
62. In Baptist Hosp. v. Cappel, 14 La. App. 626, 129 So. 425 (2d Cir. 1930) the
court completely ignored the need to characterize the defendant's promise as onerous in
order to make it enforcable.
63. The institutions almost always enter into contracts, expecting to pay for their
obligations with the promised money.
64. See Thielman v. Gahlman, 119 La. 350, 44 So. 123 (1907); Moore v. Sucher,
234 La. 1068, 102 So. 2d 459 (1958).
65. See, e.g., Barthe v. Succession of La Croix, 29 La. Ann. 326 (1877); Flood v.
Thomas, 5 Mart. (o.s.) 560 (1827).
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Repeal The Last Sentence
The last sentence of article 1967 creates an illogical exception to
the infusion of detrimental reliance into the theory of cause. Whether
detrimental reliance is a substitute for cause, an exception to cause, or
a separate source of obligations, it is apparent that its purpose is to
deal with some of the problems of cause. 66 If an informal promise has
67
an onerous cause, there will be no need to apply detrimental reliance.
If the court can find no cause, it may nevertheless enforce the promise
if all of the elements of detrimental reliance are met. If the court finds
a cause, but that cause is gratuitous, then the court cannot enforce the
promise even if all of the elements of detrimental reliance are established. 6 Thus, certain promises that would be enforceable if they had
no cause are unenforceable because they have a gratuitous cause.
It should be noted that the original draft of article 1967 did not
contain this limitation on detrimental reliance. 69 At the urging of some
of the members of the Law Institute in the September 1979 meeting
the last sentence was added to read "[rieliance on a promise made
without required formalities is not reasonable." 70 It was not until February of 1983 that the word "gratuitous" was added. Thus, the motive
for adopting the last sentence was only to make sure that the strict
requirement of formalities was never derogated from in the case of
donations."'
This author is aware that the authentic act required for donations
occupies a place of special importance in Louisiana law. Its function is
two-fold. By requiring a person to execute a written document before
a notary and two witnesses in order to promise to give away his property,
the law emphasizes the seriousness and the legally binding effects of his
actions. This requirement also provides an effective means of proving
such promises in a court of law. In effect, the requirement of form
protects one's contractual will. At civil law, the will to donate is the
basis of enforceability; consideration is not necessary. But the law is
skeptical when one claims that someone has promised to give him
something for nothing. Formalities provide proof that the party actually
did make a promise and that he knew it was legally binding, i.e., that
he really intended to be bound.
But the basis of detrimental reliance is not the intent to be bound,
66. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
67. As long as the other necessary elements of contracts are present, i.e., capacity,
consent, and object.
68. But see supra note 8.
69. Obligations Revision-Cause, supra note 6, at 2.
70. Obligations Revision-Cause, Meeting of the Louisiana State Law Institute Council, Reporter's Note, Article 2, (Feb. 18, 1983) (on file with Louisiana State Law Institute).
71. Minutes of the Meeting of Council, Louisiana State Law Institute, at 6, 7 (Feb.
18-19, 1983).
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since detrimental reliance is not really contractual in nature. It is based
on the idea that a person should not harm another person by making
promises that he will not keep. The question is not whether the promisor
really intended to perform what he promised, rather it is whether the
promise was made in such a manner that the promisor knew or should
have known that the promisee would rely upon it, and if so, whether
the promisee has in fact reasonably relied upon the promise and been
damaged thereby. When the promisee can prove all of these elements
he has shown that the promisor has dealt him an injustice, and the
court should be free to remedy the injustice suffered by the promisee.
The last sentence of article 1967 effectively creates an irrebuttable
presumption that reliance on a gratuitous promise is unreasonable. However, one does not have to think very hard to imagine situations in
which it would be reasonable. If a man promises to give money to a
charity, is it unreasonable for them to make contracts in reliance upon
this promise? If a rich uncle promises his favorite nephew that he will
pay for his education and the attendant living expenses, is it unreasonable
for the nephew to sign a six month lease at an apartment near the
school? The number of similar possible situations is infinite.
Of course, many situations may arise in which reliance upon a
gratuitous promise is not reasonable. The point is that this determination
should be left to the courts to decide in each individual case. The courts
are in the best position to determine what is fair and reasonable in
individual cases, not the legislature. The courts must try to fashion the
most equitable result in each case, but they may only use the tools
supplied by the legislature to do so. 72 Article 1967 may be a useful new

tool for the courts, but the last sentence severely limits its utility. The
legislature has supplied our courts with a shiny new knife to carve out
equitable solutions, but left them with a dull blade.
One must have faith that our courts will continue to seek fair results
even when they have limited tools with which to work. Our courts will
continue to enforce charitable subscriptions even if they have to invent
an onerous cause or ignore the requirements of form to do so. A
Louisiana court might even find a way to make the rich uncle from
the example above fulfill his promise. 73 But in order to do so, the court
must often resort to reasoning that borders on the absurd. Repealing
the last sentence of article 1967 would make it possible to enforce such
promises and stay within the bounds of logic.
Detrimental Reliance-Its Future in the Louisiana Jurisprudence
Although Louisiana's detrimental reliance will not be useful in dealing with some of the problems for which it is most needed, there are
72. La. Civ. Code art. 18.
73. The court might conclude for example that the uncle had a natural obligation
to pay for his nephew's education. See NA 1760-1762.
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several areas in which it will be useful. The fact that detrimental reliance
deals with promises indicates that its principal utility will be in handling
defective contracts. These agreements are not legal contracts because one
of the elements of contracts is missing-capacity, consent, cause, or
object-or because they violate a law of public policy.
For example, detrimental reliance might be useful to enforce certain
contractual obligations made by incompetents when justice so demands.
The civil law has always protected minors and insane people from their
own improvidence by allowing them to nullify their contracts.7 4 It seems
unfair, however, to allow this to occur when another party who had
no reason to know of their incapacity has relied to his detriment upon
the incompetent's promise. NA 192471 provides a solution to this problem
when a minor represents himself as being of majority and the other
contractant relies upon this misrepresentation. However, other such situations are not specifically provided for in the Civil Code. For example,
imagine a situation in which an interdict or a person temporarily deprived
of reason makes an agreement with another party who has no reason
to know of the incapacity. The other party then spends great sums of
money in reliance upon the incompetent's promise as the incompetent
knew he would. 76 The other party might be able to recover under NA
1921 which provides:
Upon recission of a contract on the ground of incapacity, each
party or his legal representative shall restore to the other what
he has received thereunder. When restoration is impossible or
impracticable, the court may award compensation to the party
to whom restoration cannot be made.
But if the other party's expenditures have not directly accrued to the
promisor, then the other party cannot fully recover for his losses under
this article. The court would have at least two theories under which it
could enforce the incompetent's promise. It could apply articles 1967
and 1924 by analogy, concluding that the legislature must also have
intended to protect a promisee who innocently relies upon an insane
person's promise. The court could also conclude that article 1967 alone
could be used to enforce the promise despite the promisor's capacity.
In order to support such a holding, the court would have to conclude
that detrimental reliance is not an element of a contract (because only
competents can contract), but a separate source of obligations. Counter
arguments could be made based upon the traditional protection interdicts
74.

NA 1919 retains this principle.

75. NA 1924 provides that "when the other party reasonably relies on the minor's
representation of majority, the contract may not be rescinded."
76. Of course, a legal incompetent may be incapable of knowing this at all. But it
is quite possible that a person who is legally interdicted could actually know that his

promise would induce reliance by the promisee. Cf. Turner v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270,
275 (La. 1975) (Citing Pothier, the court drew a distinction between the insane person
and the person interdicted merely because of his lavishness.).
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and minors have received as well as the context of detrimental reliance
in the code, which indicates that detrimental reliance is not a separate
source of obligations. Our courts should decide such a case based upon
the most equitable result, considering all of the applicable Code articles
and the particular facts of the case. Either decision, to enforce such a
promise or not, now finds support in the Code.
Detrimental reliance might also be used to enforce promises made in
connection with a contract that is imperfect because of some problem
of consent. An offeree is protected by the new code articles on offer
and acceptance from certain dangers . 7 An offeree is now free to consider
an offer and take action in reliance upon that promise for a reasonable
time without the possibility of the offeror revoking it prematurely. In
addition, NA 1952 protects a party who relies upon a contract which
is rescinded because of an error on the other party's behalf. 78 Article
1967 could be useful in enforcing certain promises which fall between
these situations.
For example, detrimental reliance might be used to enforce certain
offers which are revoked before formal acceptance. Most of these situations should be covered by the new articles on irrevocable offers. But
many Louisiana courts, displaying our common law influences, may be
reluctant to hold an offer as irrevocable unless consideration is given
or the offeror explicitly states a time for acceptance. If the offeree can
prove that he has been injured by his reasonable reliance upon the
offer, even the most "common law" courts in Louisiana should enforce
the promise, using the principle of detrimental reliance.
Another type of promise which may be enforced on the basis of
detrimental reliance is a gratuitous promise to do something. A gratuitous
promise to do something, which does not involve giving anything of
value to the promisee, should not be considered a donation because a
donation is the giving of a thing 79 which depletes the donor's patrimony. 0
Therefore, such a promise could be enforced under article 1967 despite
that article's last sentence.
Detrimental reliance may also be a useful theory to enforce obligations
under certain contracts which are voided for some reason of public
policy. In Coleman v. Bossier City,8' the plaintiff, Mr. Coleman, was
a real estate developer who developed a subdivision in Bossier City.
Coleman made a contract with the city whereby he would construct
water and sewage facilities in the subdivision, and the city would assume

77. See supra note 54.
78. NA 1952 allows a "reasonable compensation for the loss" incurred in such a
situation.
79. La. Civ. Code Art. 1468.
80. Smith, supra note 9, at 5.
81. 305 So. 2d 444 (La. 1974).
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operation of the facilities and reimburse Coleman for one-half of his
expenses. After Coleman completed the work, he brought an action to
enforce the contract. The contract was voided by the court because it
violated prohibitory laws requiring the city to pass a resolution and take
public bids before entering any contract for public works. The court
nevertheless enforced the city's obligation to pay Coleman under a theory
of unjust enrichment. It is unclear how the court came to the conclusion
that the city was enriched to the extent of the value of one-half of the
plaintiff's work, but the result was fair. Article 1967 could have produced
the same result with better reasoning. The court could have simply ruled
that the city was obligated by its promise to repay Coleman one-half
of his expenses because Coleman reasonably relied on its promise to his
detriment.
The courts must be very careful, however, in applying detrimental
reliance to situations such as this. In Coleman, the court found it
equitable to enforce the city's obligation because there was absolutely
2
no evidence of bad faith or fraud in the making of the illegal contract .
Likewise, detrimental reliance should only be applied in a manner as
to redress any inequities between the parties, not to allow a party to
profit from an illegal contract or his bad faith.
In sum, detrimental reliance should provide the Louisiana courts with
another theory with which to enforce promises which fail to meet all
of the regular requirements of contracts. The courts may now start their
analysis of a promise from the question of the harm that it may have
caused instead of what the promisor is getting for his promise or what
his motive was for making it. This should be especially helpful when
the court is confused or unable to determine what the cause or consideration for a promise was, but knows it was not motivated purely
by a desire to give. 3 Much like unjust enrichment, detrimental reliance
may be applied in almost any situation in which a contract is invalid
or incomplete, but the court perceives a need to remedy an injustice.
In addition, article 1967 allows the courts to tailor the amount of
recovery as justice requires. 8 4 The court may only allow the obligee
damages for the losses he has suffered or may also allow him the benefit
of the bargain. Although our courts already enjoy much discretion in
assessing damages, 85 this provision should further free them to seek the
most equitable remedy in detrimental reliance cases.
82. Id. at 446.
83. As pointed out, the courts must decide whether or not to classify the promise
as a donation before applying NA 1967. If there are no ties of kinship or any other
indication that the promise was made gratuitously (purely out of a spirit of liberality),
the promise should not be classified as a donation.
84. "Recovery may be limited to the expenses incurred or the damages suffered as
a result of the promisee's reliance on the promise." NA 1967.
85. See NA 1999.
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Conclusion
Article 1967, as written, will have a positive impact upon the Louisiana jurisprudence. It fills some gaps in our Civil Code with a rule
which is inherently fair. It is difficult to see just where this principle
fits into Louisiana's obligations theory, if it fits in at all. But it is hard
86
to imagine a situation in which its practical application would be unfair.
Perhaps its most fruitful application will be in cases which fall between
the civilian and common law concepts of contracts. 7 In this regard,
detrimental reliance can be used by a common-law-oriented Louisiana
court to enforce a promise which lacks consideration but could have
been enforceable under the theory of cause.
This optimism concerning article 1967 must be tempered by the
effect of its last sentence. This rule cannot be applied where the need
for it is most obvious. Louisiana's law without this new rule, highlighted
by the theory of cause, is very effective at enforcing promises; except
when the promise is purely gratuitous. Our courts must often ignore or
misapply the law in order to enforce gratuitous promises made without
formalities when equity so demands.
Perhaps the best solution to this problem is to change the last
sentence of article 1967 instead of repealing it completely. A new article
1967 could retain the presumption that reliance on a gratuitous promise
made without the required formalities is not reasonable, but make the
presumption rebuttable.88 This would protect the requirement of formalities for donations by explicitly telling the courts not to enforce these
promises unless it is clearly the only equitable decision. It would also
put the determination of the reasonableness of the reliance upon a
promise where it belongs in all cases, in the courtroom.
Jon C. Adcock
86. Although it would seldom be unfair, certain applications of detrimental reliance
would be unreasonable when that concept's use would upset the public order. See supra
text accompanying note 82.
87. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
88. These are some alternatives to the present form of the last sentence: "Reliance
on a gratuitous promise made without the required formalities shall be presumed to be
unreasonable." or: "Reliance on a gratuitous promise made without the required formalities
is unreasonable unless clear and convincing evidence suggests otherwise."

